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Introduction
During the past decades, German regional airports have expanded to a remarkable extent. Regional policy makers invested millions of Euros in airport facilities, aiming to ascertain that those fulfill the requirements of modern airports in an era of a rapidly growing aviation mar ket. Contrary to those ambitious expectations, today nearly all German regional airports de pend on substantial subsidies to cover their annual losses. Since the European Union decided that these subsidies violate European competition law, it will be prohibited after 2024 to use them to cover operational losses. These legal requirements will cause existential problems for a number of these regional airports.
Opponents of the subsidies feel vindicated by this decision, since in their assessment re gional airports will never find their niche between the established large airports and will never reach profitability. Proponents of the airports argue that the narrow focus on the direct losses fails to recognize their importance for regional development. They emphasize positive spillover effects for the surrounding industry, alleging that service industries and high tech branches particularly benefit from airport proximity (Sheard, 2014 , Brueckner, 2003 and Button/Taylor, 2000 . The argument of strong employment effects is used to justify the continued operation of these airports (Robertson, 1995) .
It is difficult to analyze these airport effects empirically, since typically the expansion of re gional airports is the outcome of economic and political deliberations in a real world context, and not the result of an analytical experiment. Therefore, the question what counterfactual development an airport region would have realized without the expansion cannot be an swered with ease. On the contrary, as the many attempts at the econometric evaluation of the (regional) growth effects of infrastructure investments demonstrates (e.g. Aschauer, 1989) , the problems of reverse causality and unobserved (regional) heterogeneity are almost ubiqui tous (e.g. Mukkala/Tervo, 2013 , Button et al. 2010 and Green, 2007 . This paper exploits an abrupt change in the regulation of European aviation that can be in terpreted as a quasi experiment to overcome this difficulty. Specifically, the deregulation of the European aviation market in 1997 led to a substantially redesigned aviation market (Gra ham, 1995) , providing a particularly strong incentive to expand German regional airports. De signed to strengthen competition on the airline market, this reform caused an increasing de mand for take off and landing slots at airports. Established international airports were not able not serve this increasing demand and, consequently, more airlines turned to operate from regional airports.
Contrary to investments driven by positive regional developments, this reform thus led to investments which were set by exogenous changes in the structure of the aviation market (Graham, 2010 , Barrett, 2000 and can therefore be regarded as a (quasi )experiment. The paper documents that several airports indeed invested extensively to prepare their regional airports for the needs of modern and international airlines and passengers. Furthermore, the location of German airports is closely linked to German military history since most of them were converted from military to civilian use in the past (Behnen, 2004) . Their original location followed military strategies instead of economic reasoning (Cidell, 2003) . These circumstances facilitate an analysis of exogenous airport expansions on the basis of a difference in differences approach (DiD) which overcomes regional heterogeneity problems.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper scrutinizing the recently discussed ef fect of regional airports expansions using an exogenous event as identification strategy.
2 The results are sobering. The estimations start with the application of a basic model, ignoring any potential endogeneity problems, which compares prosperity levels in regions with and without airports. Such a preliminary approach indeed suggest airport induced regional prosperity. However, when endogeneity problems are taken into account by exploiting the European de regulation of 1997, this effect vanishes. This result is confirmed by various robustness checks. There is simply no evidence that spillovers spreading out from such expansions of regional airports could justify their overwhelming subsidization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing liter ature, emphasizing endogeneity issues and the institutional settings of the deregulation. Sec tion 3 describes the data set and outlines the DiD. The results and various robustness checks are presented in section 4, and, finally, section 5 concludes.
EU aviation market reform as source of exogenous variation

Existing literature and conceptual challenges
Proponents of regional airports argue that airports act as a driving force of regional devel opment, because airports tend to increase income and employment in the local economy (ELFAA, 2004) . They typically focus on three transmission channels (see Button, 2010 for fur ther subdivisions): (i) direct effects, realized through employment and investments at the air port, (ii) indirect effects, in the chain of suppliers of goods and services related to the airport, and (iii) induced effects which comprise the surplus of employment through spending of di rectly and indirectly employed individuals. Beside these three channels, airports are supposed to have a catalytic effect by improving productivity and attracting economic and touristic activ ities (e.g. EU Committee of the Regions, 2004 , Cezanne/Mayer, 2003 .
However, obtaining empirical evidence for such airport effects is a challenging task. Argua bly, the simplest method for examining whether the existence of an airport affects growth in the surrounding region -a direct comparison of growth between airport and non airport regions -will lead to biased estimates, due to omitted regional heterogeneity. Even though one might be able to control for a wide range of observable variables, this identification strat egy would still be prone to suffering from unobservable heterogeneity, in particular embodied in such regional pre conditions which are likely to be correlated with the existence of an air port. Since the location of an airport is not random, there might be higher probability for the erection of an airport in a prospering region. In this context, the application of fixed effects estimations in panel data frameworks (Islam, 1995) is of little help since the existence of an airport is a fixed effect itself.
Focusing on airport activities, such as flights, passengers or cargo development (Florida et al., 2012) helps to introduce further variation in the dataset. However, as long as increased activities do not have an experimental exogenous character, it is not possible to distinguish whether improving regional conditions influence airport activity as found by Goetz (1992) and Dobruszkes et al. (2011) or vice versa as suggested by the airport proponents. Specifically, this problem occurs if future regional development is anticipated and airport expansions are based upon it. In this case, time series analyzes, e.g., provided by Green (2007) , Mukkala/Tervo (2013) or Button/Yuan (2013) cannot help to identify a leading and a following process.
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More promising identification strategies can be derived from exogenous events. Brueckner (2003) and Sheard (2014) 4 , for instance, apply the concept of instrumental variables in their analyses. However, finding exogenous events or proper instruments which are able to predict airport size but do not correlate with regional circumstances is a challenging task. Bloning en/Cristea (2012) consider the US "Aviation Deregulation act" 5 in 1978 which was endorsed to promote competition in the aviation market as an exogenous event. Acting under market pres sure after the reform, airlines focused their activities on the central airports since subsidies for peripheral connections were cut. These shifts initiated remarkable increases and decreases in the various airports' activities (Burghouwt/Hakfoort, 2001) , exogenous from the respective regional development. Based on the deregulation act, Bloningen/Cristea (2012) observe that increasing airport activities affect population growth, per capita income and employment posi tively.
Although, their paper offers a promising methodological approach for the evaluation of general airport effects the setup is less relevant for the particular examination of regional air port effects. Their study is restricted to the examination of exogenously induced growth of big airports in central metropolitan areas. By definition, regional airports (in the scope of this pa per) are rather small and they are located in less central areas. Therefore, effects obtained from the US deregulation act cannot be translated to the expansion of regional airports and the growth effects of the surrounding regions.
EU aviation market reform
Encouraged by the apparent success of market deregulations in the US, in 1983 the Euro pean Commission started a deregulation initiative, the Single European Aviation Market (Gra ham, 1997). The post reform period in the US demonstrated how enhanced competition could lead to an increase of suppliers and flights and, decreasing prices. The deregulation of the Eu ropean market was split into three separate steps. The first two steps were implemented in 1988 and 1990 (Graham, 1995 and were characterized by rather small changes such as the permission of bilateral intra EU agreements, the validity of competition rules for the aviation and implementation of three bounded fare zones which allowed tickets to be supplied below the standard minimum fares (Schenk 2004: 95ff) . 6 Substantial changes in the structure were initiated by the third step (Graham, 1997) . This included the harmonization of the airline licensing processes, entire liberalization of ticket fares and the abolition of capacity regulations between member states. The involved suspen sion of all cabotage restrictions 7 opened the market for a range of new airlines (Schenk 2004: 98) . These trends changed the market dramatically since a substantial number of airlines en tered the German market as further competitors, leading to an increased number of flights (see Thompson, 2002 for France). Nevertheless, slots (for departures and arrivals), ground operation services and booking systems represented a bottleneck for the operation of increas ing traffic. National carriers enjoyed grandfathering rights for the slots and services without convincing "use it or lose it" rules (Schenk, 2004) . Thus, the appropriate access of new compet itors to the established airports was hindered and they had to divert their business to regional airports.
The increased number of competitors and the shortage of slots at established airports pro vided strong incentives to regional policy makers to engage into airport expansion. Graham (1997) documents substantial benefits for regional airports and for the newly emerging re gional airlines.
8 Furthermore, the reform incentivized regional policy makers to expand the airports right in 1997 when new airlines entered the market and increased the demand for the services of regional airports to conduct their operations. Thus, the reform forms a (quasi )experiment, since the timing of the expansions was determined by legislation, not by econom ic considerations. Germany implemented the regulation as late as possible in the beginning of 1997, for years after it passed European Council in 1993. This long period ensures that plan ners had enough time to prepare the airports for the increasing demand for services. Moreo ver, pre reform adjustment of the air services (Ashenfelter's Dip problem, Ashenfelter 1978) could not occur since the restrictive regulations were still intact.
The scope of the reform strengthens its interpretation as an exogenous event with respect to regional development. The European Commission intended to intensify competition be tween airlines (Graham, 1998) , while the incentives for regional airport expansions were only side effects of the reform. This contrasts with regional policy measures which are specifically designed to compensate for disadvantages of the targeted regions. As Behnen (2004) points out, the reform did not only cause a revolution in the sky but, especially in Germany, also on the ground.
Moreover, the initial location of German regional airports is also quite unrelated to the economic circumstances surrounding them, since most of the today's regional airports have served as military bases in some stages of their existence, before they were converted into civilian use (Behnen, 2004) . Therefore, their location was not driven by the economic needs of a region or favorable economic pre conditions (Cidell, 2003) , but was rather based on military strategies and the associated distribution of the air force.
Taken together, the military background of the initial locations of regional airports, the en compassing scope of the reform which did not intend to support the regional airports, and the exogenous impetus leading to the investments into regional airport expansion form three ar guments which facilitate the examination of the causal effects of airport expansions on region al prosperity.
Data and Identification Strategy
The DiD approach provides a sound identification strategy for the evaluation of the poten tial regional growth effects which might have been induced by the deregulation of the aviation market. Since the dataset 9 contains annual information on German counties (NUTS 3 level) for the period from 1991 to 2008, the pre 1997 years serve as pre treatment period and the latter as treatment period. The demarcation into treatment and control regions is more challenging. Obviously, those regions with a regional airport are regarded as the treatment group. As the research question focusses on the effects for regional airports and detailed reactions of estab lished (international) airports on the deregulation remain unclear, such regions with interna tional airports are omitted in the evaluation.
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For this purpose, the distinction between international and regional airports has to be de fined. The main definition of regional airports in this paper relies on the pre reform passenger figures provided by the German Airport Association (ADV). All those airports with less than one million passengers in 1996 are included in the treatment group as regional airports. This arbi trary definition is extensively tested in the robustness checks which contain varying thresholds from 0.5 million to 5 million passengers per year. Less promising distinctions are the airports' legal permissions (which are subdivided into international and regional permissions) 11 or the categorization of its members provided by the ADV itself (which suffers from self selection problems). 12 German counties without a regional or an international airport serve as the con trol group.
The growth of GDP per labor force (GDPpl) is the most promising indicator which can cap ture the range of assumed spillovers from regional airports to regional prosperity. Therefore, the growth of nominal GDP per labor force is used as the main outcome variable. 13 Since the GDP per labor force may also have some minor shortcomings 14 further estimations in the ro bustness checks are applied with the growth of total GDP, GDP per capita and employment as dependent variables.
In contrast to the majority of airport evaluations which exploit terms of air services (Allroggen/Malina, 2014) , this paper focusses on the pure existence of infrastructure captured in a cross sectional treatment dummy (a i ) turning 1 if the region has a regional airport and 0 otherwise. The time dummy (t t ) indicates the post treatment era and their interaction (DiD it ) marks the variable of interest, the DiD indicator. Starting with a pure DiD as first estimation, a varying set of controls (x kit ) is subsequently included to provide an indication of the robustness of the estimates.
An increasing set of control variables can account for regional heterogeneity will tend to improve the precision of the estimates. However, especially in the context of regional econom ics, the inclusion of controls is problematic as they might themselves be an outcome of the treatment (Angrist/Pischke (2008) 
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, Becker et al. 2014 ). In the context of airport expansions this is relevant for, e.g., regional investments which might be increased by the expansions. Developments of these "bad controls" which are driven by the treatment may bias the esti mated effect of the treatment on the outcome variable, due to the correlation between the bad control and the outcome variable.
The lagged level of population, population density and employment are included as con trols. Furthermore, the lagged level of the left hand side variable, the level of GDP per labor force, is included. This is standard for models based on neoclassical theory but poses problems 11 However, the offered flight destinations do not justify this distinction. International flights are also provided from those airports which are legally defined as regional airports. See destinations of, e.g., Dortmund Wickede (http://www.dortmund airport.com/f2a0c5cf806929ea/passengers visitors) regarding its implicit dynamic component. Since the outcome (gy i,t =ln(y i,t ) ln(y i,t 1 )) correlates with the model's error term ( it ), the regressor (y i,t 1 ) also correlates with the error term, lead ing to biased estimates (see Nickell 1981 or Baltagi 2008 for an overview). As Bruno (2005) shows, the dynamic corrected fixed effect estimator based on an initial Blundell/Bond (1998) estimation provides satisfactory results for rather short samples periods. Results based on this estimation method are presented in the appendix.
The estimations are based on the following model.
where i=1,…,N is the cross sectional and t=1,…,T is the time dimension, k and 1 , 2 and 3 are regression coefficients to be estimated, and i,t is an independent and identically distributed error term (i.i.d.). All economic variables are taken from BBR (2011). Estimation is based on the model being transformed into first differences, thereby excluding the individual a i
The host county of an airport might not be the right delineation for capturing the airport's economic contribution. Typically, airports are not located in the center of counties; this espe cially holds for airports located in bigger cities. They are rather situated in the periphery of cities or in adjacent counties. Thus, simply considering the host counties of airports as relevant regional unit is not appropriate, since their economic effects spread out to adjacent regions (i.e., spillovers cross county borders). This problem is tackled by defining imputed airport re gions which deliberately construct buffers around the airport's reference point (see Paloyo et al. 2010 for details).
The chosen radius of 15 kilometers roughly represents the mean radius of German coun ties. Thus, the buffer size is rather small. 16 The paper concentrates on the regional effects in the immediate proximity of an airport. Furthermore, since many local municipalities provide large shares of the subsidies and they justify this by the positive spillovers, such small buffers are the right demarcation for the objective of this paper. Thus, hinterland effects are inten tionally disregarded in this approach. Whether air transport supply has a positive overall im pact on Germans economy is a separate question.
The economic characteristics of these airport buffers are defined by the variables of those administrative counties which are located in the buffer. Precisely, the buffer variables are de fined by the within buffer weighted means, with the respective spatial shares serving as weights. Since nearly all airport buffers consist of more than one county (the only exception is Hannover Langenhagen), the number of observations is much smaller than the number of regions.
17 Although Düsseldorf Weeze and Memmingen are regional airports today, they are ignored in the empirical analyses, since they did not serve as regional airports in 1997. Weeze was opened in 2003 while civilian use in Memmingen started in 2004. All these limitations reduce the original sample size of 413 German counties to 271 observed regional units. An overview on the regional and international airports as well as a map with the buffers is provid ed in Figure A .1 in the appendix.
Descriptive statistics of the sample are provided in Table 1 . It appears that regions with a re gional airport and those without these facilities do not differ substantially. The mean GDP per labor force growth is 0.002 percentage points higher in the airport regions. 18 The airport and non airport regions do not differ substantially in almost all the variable means, as the t test in the last column documents. Only the log of population and employment display higher means in the airport regions. The investment activities at German regional airports reflect the incentives which the deregu lation of the aviation market provided to regional policy makers. Various types of investments were undertaken; airports expanded their terminals or runways and better connections to public transport were established. In addition, some airports provided regular air services with scheduled flights for the first time after the reform. Only for three of the 24 regional airports, there are no explicit investments found for 1997 and the adjacent years. 
Results
To provide a first impression, results from a basic estimation setup demonstrate whether airport regions display a higher GDP per labor force than non airport regions. 20 Note that the motivation for these estimations is merely to illustrate the endogeneity bias of such a setup in comparison to the subsequent identification strategies, based on the (quasi )experiment. Fo cusing on this preferable identification approach, a DiD model is estimated after the common trend assumption is tested. These baseline estimations are followed by various robustness checks to consider three crucial issues of the identification: First, the Ashenfelter's Dip prob lem, second the sensitivity to changes of the definition and the spatial demarcation of the treatment group and third changing definitions of the control group. A number of secondary tests are presented in the appendix.
Estimation results
The first impression in Table 2 shows that the existence of an airport -unconstrained on international or regional (column (i) and (ii)) -clearly correlates with the level of regional GDP per labor force. The specification including control variables (column (ii)) suggests that the GDP per labor force is 3.5% higher compared to regions without an airport. Omitting all interna tional airports from the sample reduces this effect to 1.9% in column (iv), although it remains significant. However, these findings can only draw an incomplete picture, since the estimation approach disregards any endogeneity problems. 19 Excluding these three regions from the estimations does not change the following results. 20 In contrast to subsequent DiD estimations based on the growth of the GDP per labor force, this estimation is based on the its level values since potential airport induced growth effect faded in after their opening and they should show up in higher level values today. Note: ***,**,* denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% level. Robust standard errors clustered on county level in parentheses.
To support the application of the DiD approach, Figure 1 displays the growth of the GDP per labor force separately for treated and non treated regions. The basic assumption of the DiD implies that both groups would have developed equally in the absence of the treatment. Since this is an assumption on the counterfactual it cannot be statistically tested. A visual in spection of Figure 1 shows only minor level differences in the pre treatment development which can be captured by regional fixed effects (Angrist/Pischke, 2008) , therefore the DiD seems to be a suitable method. This impression is corroborated by "placebo regressions" with altered definitions of the treatment in the robustness tests. Note further, that a simple "before and after" analysis of airport regions instead of a DiD would provide misleading results since it only focuses on the higher growth of GDP per labor force among airport regions after the reform without account ing for the quite similar development of the control regions over time. The main results in Table 3 do not show a statistical significant expansion effect of the re gional airports on growth. The variable of interest (DiD estimator) which accounts for reform induced growth remains insignificant. The growing number of control variables does not have any influence on the statistical significance of the DiD coefficient. These results are confirmed by rather similar results in Table A .1 which consider the dynamic correction of the fixed effect model as proposed by Bruno (2005) . Since the dynamic correction initially atarts from a Blun dell Bond (1998) estimation which also faces some shortcomings, e.g., potentially imprecise estimators in a rather small cross sectional (Bruno 2005) , and since the dynamic component seems not to bias standard fixed effect estimations, the further estimations are based on the standard fixed effect model. Note: ***,**,* denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% level. Robust standard er rors clustered on county level in parentheses.
Robustness Tests
Potential weaknesses of the main results are tested in the following robustness checks. First, the estimations of a DiD might be biased since reform effects are anticipated and pre reform adjustments to the new scenery take place (Ashenfelter's Dip). Although airport plan ners did anticipate the reform they could not benefit from pre reform adjustments since the market situation could not change notably before the deregulation. Therefore, an earlier in vestment did not lead to advantages in the pre reform period. Nevertheless, construction measures which were required before the deregulation to provide adequate infrastructure may bias the results. This bias may be twofold, on the one hand reform induced constructions may have caused pre reform growth and therefore bias the expansion effect downwards. On the other hand, airport operations may have been reduced due to such constructions in pre reform years leading to an upward bias of the estimated expansion effect. The Ashenfelter's dip problem concerns the pre reform years. Since the expansion effects may have taken time to spread out and to attract airport activities (and since some invest ments were not completed in time) the first two post treatment years are excluded in further estimations. The results of the two strategies are presented in Table 4 , column (i) and (ii) focus on the Ashenfelter's dip and exclude the years 1996 and 1995, the latter columns exclude the years 1997 and 1998. Table 4 shows that the estimated DiD coefficients remain insignificant when excluding these years. Note: ***,**,* denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% level. Robust standard errors clustered on county level in parentheses.
As second robustness check, the treatment group is varied by the definition of the thresh old between regional and international airports. Since the assumption to treat all airports (listed by the ADV) with at most one million passengers per year as regional airports might be crucial, this threshold is varied from 0.5 million to 5 million passengers in columns (i) (v) in Table 5 . Since those airport regions with passenger numbers above the threshold are excluded from the estimations, the number of included regions and observations increase with an in creasing threshold. The last column restricts the treatment group on the legally defined re gional airports independent of the respective passenger numbers. 21 The results in Table 5 show that the DiD coefficient is robust to the different definitions of the treatment group. 21 The estimations in Table 4 cover the same controls as column (iv) in Table 3 . Thus, results of column (ii) (1 mil lion passengers) equals column (iv) in Table 3 . Note: ***,**,* denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% level. Robust standard errors clustered on county level in parentheses.
Furthermore, the size of the buffers which mark the treated regions around the airports is varied. The radius of the treatment buffer is doubled (30 km) to observe potential effects in a larger group of regions. Based on this enlarged buffer size, the DiD coefficient turns slightly negative (presented in column (i) of Table 6 ). In addition, one might be concerned that the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) is violated in the estimations setup. If the regions within treatment buffer affect the outcome of the adjacent control regions by some negative or positive spillovers, the coefficient of the treatment estimator is biased.
To overcome this problem, again the 15 km buffers are considered as treatment group. But, to prevent a direct transition from treatment to control group, all regions within the 30 km buffer but outside the 15 km buffer are ignored and neither considered as members of the treatment nor the control group. Thus, spillovers from treated regions cannot directly influ ence the control group (column (ii) of Table 6 ). This estimation does not show a significant result. Third, one might be concerned that the broad delineation of the control group which com prises all German regions without an airport is inappropriate. As discussed in section 2, air ports might be located in regions with specific economic characteristics. Hence, if these char acteristics determine the probability for having an airport on the one hand and the growth expectations over the treatment period on the other hand, the empirical strategy, may lead astray. In econometric terms, the characteristics of the control variables may not overlap be tween the treatment regions and a critical mass of control regions in the sample. According to this concern, control regions which differ substantially from the airport regions in their region al characteristics would have to be excluded from the estimation.
In the spirit of a matching approach, a propensity score is estimated based on a probit model.
On the left hand side, the dummy p i indicates if a region has an airport (p i =1) or not (p i =0). On the right hand side, z i indicates a very broad set of regional controls, k are the related coeffi cients to be estimated and, i is an i.i.d. error term. Since variation over time does not really offer further information, the model is estimated with observations of the year 1996, the last pre reform observation. The estimated outcomes (p ) indicate a regional probability for host ing an airport. The range of the estimated airport probabilities (p ) of the airport regions de cides which regions enter the control group. 22 Only those non airport regions with a (p ) within the range of (p ) of airport regions are considered in the control group. Regions with an exceptionally low probability for having an airport are excluded. 
No. of Obs 287
Note: ***,**,* denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
As Table 7 shows, the range of predicted airport probabilities ( ) for airport regions cover a spectrum from 1.5% to 99.8%. This result suggests that there is basically no region which has 22 To give an example, if the lowest predicted airport probability of an airport region is 50%, all those control re gions with a probability below 50% are excluded from the following DiD estimation.
ppp no realistic probability for hosting an airport. Thus, the broad selection of the control groups poses no problems. 23 This finding supports the argument that the military background of most airports is much more important for airport location than any economic considerations.
Further robustness checks are provided in the appendix. Table A .2 presents two "placebo regressions" which refer to a hypothetical deregulation event during the pre treatment period ignoring all post treatment observations and another hypothetical deregulation event during the post treatment period ignoring all pre treatment observations. While an artificial treat ment during the pre treatment period strengthens the previously discussed common trend assumption, the latter artificial treatment can rather indicate effects of the treatment which fade in after a certain time. The years 1994 and 2000 are chosen for the hypothetical reform. In both cases, the coefficient of the DiD remains insignificant.
To ensure that these results are not based on the lower productivity of new jobs caused by the airport expansion, regressions with the growth of total GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and growth of the employment as dependent variables are applied and reported in Table A. 3 (column (i) (iii)). None of these changes leads to diverging findings. To avoid the deterioration of the aviation market after 9/11, the sample period ends 2001 in column (iv) which does not change the observed results.
Conclusion
The EU Commission has recently announced that subsidization of airports which merely survive due to substantial public support will be prohibited after 2024. Since most of the smaller and regional airports in Germany are currently subsidized, they are facing severe prob lems for their future existence. Proponents of the regional airports emphasize the importance of positive spillovers on employment and economic growth throughout the region. This paper probes if German regional airports indeed generate a better economic performance in their environment.
Investments in infrastructure such as airports are an outcome of economic performance and future economic expectations and, correspondingly, evaluations suffer from the related endogeneity problems. The deregulation of the European aviation market marks an exogenous event which can be seen as a (quasi) experiment for the expansion of regional airports. An increasing number of airlines demanded further operation slots in Germany and shifted to the regional airports. And those airports prepared their infrastructure with massive investments to fulfill the airlines' requirements, quite independent from the contemporaneous economic conditions. Furthermore, the military background of most regional airports makes their loca tion less dependent on the economic conditions in their environment.
Based on the assumed exogeneity of the expansion, a DiD is applied which conducts the period after the reform in 1997 as treatment period. For the spatial definition of the treat ment, regional buffers with a radius of 15km are constructed around the airports. Ignoring the possible endogeneity problems would lead to a positive estimation of airport effects on the GDP per labor force. This appears to drive earlier positive findings such as Allroggen/Malina (2014) . However, when taking into account the preferred deregulation based identification strategy, the estimated effects are negligible.
A broad set of robustness checks strengthens these findings. The results are robust to a change of the definition of regional airports, various demarcations of the control and treat ment groups, avoidance of an Ashenfelter's dip by the exclusion of years around the deregula tion, and changes of the dependent variable. A reason for these sobering results might be the overwhelming opportunity costs of the airport operation. Since many municipalities spent high amounts in the operation of the airports, this capital is tied up by the airport and other -pos sibly better investments -are precluded. This overall result is supported by a recently pub lished report of the European Court of Auditors that detected severe unsuccessful subsidized airport projects in southern European countries with sobering cost benefit relations (EUCA 21/2014).
Note that the evidence presented here does not suggest any conclusions regarding the ef fects of international airports. It may be the case that airports need to exceed a certain threshold to fade out spillovers. Furthermore, the high density of airports in Germany may be a reason for the results, since further benefits of an expanded airport might be rather low in a dense airport network. Besides the advances of the applied identification strategy, this might be a further explanation for the differing findings in this paper compared to existing literature for other countries.
Based on the economic effects, this paper does not confirm concerns of regional politicians that regions will suffer once airport subsidies will be cut. Since the expansion of airports had no positive effects, a downscaling of activities towards sustainable airports without subsidies is not supposed to have major negative effects on the surrounding municipalities. In addition, the provision of better regional air transport infrastructure does not seem to be a promising instrument to stimulate growth in lagging regions. Note: ***,**,* denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% level. Robust standard errors clustered on county level in parentheses. 
